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Summary  findings
The notion of free banking is at least as difficult to define  eliminate all roguies).  The Avr Bank is the onlv major
as the notioni of central banking. Instead, Kroszner focuses  exception to the smooth operation of Scotland's private
on a relativelv unregulated banking system that operated  clearing and monitoring system in more than a century,
in Scotland in the eighteenth and nineteenlth centuries.  and the system helped to contain the problems fromii  this
(Sweden adopted a similar system.) Kroszner argues that a  bank's collapse-fulfilled  a role typically considered to
relatively  uinregulated  system is a wise option for emerging  helong to a central bank.
markets today, which exhibit manv features of the  There are private alternatives to deposit insurance or
eighteenth and nineteenth century Scottish economy.  to a central bank to maintain confidence in and foster the
In terms of private institutions and monitoring  stability of the financial system.
(typically thought to be a central bank responsibility:  *  Sophisticated note and deposit contracts are feasible.
* A private clearing system is feasible.  *  Free entry is important  to encourage innovation.
* So are private development and enforcement of  *  Branching and portfolio diversification can
capital and liquidity standards.  substitute for deposit insurance, to stabilize the bankinig
Financial institutions have strong private incentives to  system. So can "extended"  liability (beyonid  simple
create their own clearing system, to benefit both banks  limited liability of the shareholders), to give depositors
and the public. In creating suchi  a system, the instituitions  and note holders some assurance that a bank could
develop standards for capital, liquidity, and prudential  withstand a negative shock. Another alternative to
management that will become requirements for  deposit insurance is the "option clause" or other
membership in the system. Modern examples: the  contingent or equity-like contracts, which can solve or
Chicago Board of Trade  and Chicago Mercantile  minimize the problem of bank runs.
Exchange.  Is any role left for a central banik as lender of last
Competition  is generally compatible with prudence  resort? An explicit central bank may not be needed, but
and coordination (although the excessive note issue by  rather mechanisms to provide added liquidity, perhaps
the Avr Bank demonstrates that the system did not  through the clearing system, in times of trouble.
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Tables  and FiguresThe  notion of free banking  is at least  as difficult  to define  as the notion  of central  banking. Rather  than
enumerate  the principles  that must be met in order for a financial  system  to be characterized  as a "free
banking"  system,  this chapter  focuses  on the features  of a relatively  unregulated  banking  system that
operated in Scotland  during the eighteenth  and nineteenth  centuries. Although  the term free banking is
often  used to describe  U.S. banking  during  the mid-nineteenth  century,  its meaning  changes  when
describing  the Scottish  experience. Other countries,  such as Sweden,  have had experiences  similar to
Scotland's  during the nineteenth  century. Allegedly,  a Swedish  clergyman  visited Scotland,  observed  the
wonders  of its banking  system,  and proselytized  its virtues  back  in Sweden,  where it was eventually
adopted.
Although  I am certainly  no clergyman,  I will nonetheless  attempt  to convince  you that a
relatively  unregulated  system is a wise  option  for emerging  markets  today. I am somewhat  critical of
some aspects  of this type of system-it  definitely  has impurities. I also wish  to avoid  defining  pure
freedom  or complete  lack of regulation. When  considering  the financial  system, we must look beyond
the explicit  regulation  of the banking  and financial  sectors  to consider  broader  issues  of, for example,
contractual  innovation  and contractual  enforcement.
In this chapter  I first argue  that many features  of the eighteenth  and nineteenth  century  Scottish
economy  are seen in emerging  market economies  today. Certainly  there is much  variation  across
transition  economies,  but at least some aspects  of the Scottish  economy  are relevant  for thinking  about
policies  for these economies.
1In the second part of the chapter I describe how the Scottish free banking system operated.  The
discussion will highlight how specific institutions emerged, identify the private incentives that led to
their development, and show how they performed.  In particular, I will focus on competition among the
note-issuing banks, the innovative note contracts that became widespread, the emergence of a private
clearing system, the stability of the banking system, and the role of bank branching.  To evaluate
performance, England provides a useful benchmark because although the macroeconomic shocks to the
English and Scottish economies were highly correlated, their banking systems were very different.
England, for example, had many restrictions on the size and expansion of banks and many protective
regulations for the Bank of England, which was emerging as the central bank.  Scotland had no such
regulations.  Rather, it had relatively free entry into banking and into the private issuance of bank notes.
There was vigorous currency competition in Scotland, unlike in England, although both countries wvere
on the gold standard for most of the period. The final section concludes with lessons for financial reform
in emerging markets today.
Scotland  as an Emerging  Market Economy
While Scotland of 200 years ago may not immediately come to mind when considering emerging market
economies today, it is very relevant for current development policy. The initial conditions and
challenges faced by Scotland parallel those that many emerging economies are now grappling with.  In
particular, they share six common elements: an initial low level of GDP per capita compared with
industrial countries, legal uncertainty over financial contracts, lack of experience with financial services,
the importance of international trade, the dominance of a neighboring financial center, and substantial
macroeconomic shocks, including wars.
2In the beginning of the eighteenth century Scotland was much poorer than England.  By the mid-
eighteenth century the GNP per capita in Scotland was roughly half of that in England.  By the mid-
ninieteenth century, however, Scotland's GDP per capita nearly equaled that of England.  The relative
poverty of many emerging countries is similar to Scotland's relative poverty in the 1700s, although the
disparity in GDP per capita may be wider today.  The example of Scotland gives us hope that many
developing countries can reach Western European and U.S. standards of living if appropriate policies are
pursued.
One of the most intriguing parallels between eighteenth-century Scotland and many developing
countries today concerns the infancy of contract law and the difficulties in enforcing contracts. The
common law of contracts was still in its early stages of development in the early eighteenth century,
becoming what we think of as the common law only in the nineteenth century.  During the eighteenth
century many types of contracts and different types of enforcement mechanisms were tried, and new
forms evolved.  The legal form of the business enterprise was problematic.  Following the Bubble Act of
1720, special grants from the Crown or acts of parliament were necessary to get a limited liability
corporate charter, the form of incorporation that is the standard structure for most enterprises today.
Instead, during this period the vast majority of banks as well as most other business enterprises were
organized as partnerships. But it was often very difficult and costly to bring an enforcement action
against a partnership because action would have to be taken against each partner.  Sometimes businesses
made sure that at least one of the partners was difficult to find-perhaps  living in a colony-thereby
delaying and making it more expensive to take action against the partnership.
Even if taking action against an enterprise or business person did not involve such travails, many
financial contracts had only recently been developed or were being used in new ways.  Because so much
of the law was new, people could not rely on an extensive body of common-law decisions to interpret
3what each contract promised.  At this time, for example, privately owned banks issued their own bank
notes.  The law was struggling to determine whetlier a bank note was a promissory note or a debt
contract, and which obligations were associated with the contract. The Scottish case is thus relevant
because we see many of the same problems in emerging markets today.  There is uncertainty about
contract law, whicii evolves rapidly.  There was much experimentation with forms and obligations.  But
althouah having the law in suchI  a state of flux was not a perfect situation, many different types of
contracts were used and successful contracts emerged from this process.
The rapid changes were posing challenges for the law and lawyers as well as for ordinary
citizens.  Financial contracts and markets were new to the Scottish population during the free banking
era, much as they are to the average person in many of today's transition and developing economies.
Aspects of the financial system now considered commonplace, such as bank notes and checkable
deposits, simply did not exist in Scotland before the eighteenth century.  Financial innovations occurred
quite rapidly, but the population was able to successfully adapt to them.  There was no equivalent of the
Securities and Exchange Commission to ensure full and fair disclosure beyond the standard antifraud
aspects of the common law.  While some may argue that the public is often not able to adjust to these
types of rapid innovations, in Scotland competition provided a substantial amount of discipline and
information to this market.  When one bank or firm created a new type instrument or included a new type
of clause, competitors often responded by publicly questioning the innovation in advertisements:  "stick
with our tried-and-true product because the new one has the following flaws..."
International trade played an important role in the Scottish economy, subjecting it to numerous
external shocks.  Scotland was, for example, very involved in the intemational tobacco trade.  Many
emerging countries today are closely tied to developments in the international economy (and many wish
to be even more involved in international trade).
4The domestic financial market of Scotland was not isolated from other financial markets.
Economic historians have investigated and debated the extent of the integration of European capital
markets during the 1  700s and 1  800s.  It is very clear that Scotland was greatly influenced by activities in
London-the  Bank of England certainly exercised some control over the Scottish economy.  The key
question concerns the extent of that control.  Such questions are raised today, for example, in the role
that Tokyo plays in emerging financial markets in Asia; London or Frankfurt in the markets of the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; and the United States in many markets, such as those in Latin
America.
Just as in many emerging markets today, the Scottish economy was subject to major
macroeconomic and financial disruptions during its transition from a developing to an industrial
economy.  For Scotland, England, and Wales this time period was not one of perfectly smooth growth.
Several wars were fought, perhaps the most important being the Napoleonic wars fought against the
French.  This war caused a major disruption in the financial system.  The United Kingdom had been on
the international gold standard until 1797, when they suspended it for roughly twenty years.  Public debts
to finance the war also increased.
Operation and Performance of the Scottish Free Banking System
The free banking era in Scotland begins with the end of the Bank of Scotland's monopoly on note issue in
1716 and ends in 1844-45 with Peel's Banking Act (figure 3.1). The legislative changes in 1844-45
effectively shut down free entry, and incumbents put limits on private note issue, thereby cartelizing the
Scottish banking industry and making it much more like the English system.  This Act brought the
banking system of Scotland formally under the control of the Bank of England.
5At the beginning of the period only one bank, the Bank of Scotland, was issuing currency.  Two
other banks then entered-the  Royal Bank of Scotland and the British Linen Bank.  The British Linen
Bank began as a linen trading company, and banking functions developed naturally from its merchant
activities.  These three banks had charters from the Crown or special grants from parliament that made
them limited liability corporations.  Other banks that subsequently entered during the free banking era
did so as unlimited liability partnerships (although there was a bit more flexibility beginning in the
1  820s).  The three big limited liability banks were a very important part of the financial system, initially
holding the majority of Scotland's banking assets.
Private Note Issze
These banks freely competed in note issuance.  The notes were denominated in pounds, and the pound
was defined as a certain amount of specie.  The notes were obligations of the individual banks, and they
competed vigorously to try to get people to take their notes rather than those of a rival bank. The
transactionis  technologies were not well developed.  At the beginning of this era, for example, there were
no checkinig  accounts per se, and people relied primarily oni  coinis  and notes for most transactions.  The
equivalent of checkable deposits and automatic overdraft facilities developed later.  The banks paid
interest on deposits.  For larger transactions businesses used instruments called "bills of exchange,"
whiichi  were similar to negotiable commercial paper and relatively large in denomination.
In an environment with this type of transactions technology the banks focused on trying to
deliver their notes to the public and on having the public hold them for as long as possible, before
bringincg  them in to be redeemed in specie.  The banks would benefit when individuals deposited specie,
whiicih  they would then issue notes on.  Banks also benefited when someone brought a bill of exchange or
some other instrument for discount, which they exchanged for bank notes.  The notes they issued were
6non-interest bearing, at least in normal times.  The profitability of issuance was thus directly related to
the length of time that the public would hold the notes without demanding redemption.  With less-
frequent redemptionis,  banks could hold less gold reserves.  The banks earned returns by holding interest-
earning assets, such as government securities and commercial paper equivalents, or by making loans or
other  investments.
Competition among note issuers led each bank to try to demonstrate how solid and reliable it was
relative to other banks, and this competition effectively regulated the specie reserves held in the banking
system.  Banks wanted to economize on the amount of specie they had to hold for a given level of note
issue, but also had to maintain the public's confidence that they could redeem the notes.  High demand
for note redemption could cause a liquidity problem-and  a general loss of confidence-for  a bank
unless it held high specie reserves, which would, of course, reduce the profitability of note issuance.  The
banks, realizing this, would keep a check on the liquidity ratios of their competitors through a process
called "note dueling."
The Royal Bank of Scotland, for example, would attempt to gather up as much of the outstanding
note issue as possible from its rival, the Bank of Scotland. The bank hired people called "note pickers"
to collect the rival's notes, some of whom might even offer a little reward to individuals who would
exchanige  their Bank of Scotland notes for the Royal Bank's notes.  The note pickers would then
simultaneously converge upon the Bank of Scotland and demand:  "redeem these notes as you promised,
give us the gold now."  Because of this market mechanism-which  could be thought of as runs on a
bank-these  banks, which were moving toward a fractional reserve system, could not reduce their
reserves by too much (because of the threat of a redemption attack by their rivals).  This mechanism was
used by both large and small banks.  Competitive rivalry thus had the salubrious effect of forcing rivals
to maintain reasonable reserve ratios.  And this important aspect of market discipline emerged naturally.
7Thie  Delvelopmlent  of ihe Optioni  Claiuse
This riaorous competition also generated substantial contractual innovation, known as "the option
clause."  In the 1  750s the Bank of Scotland, a private bank, would pay the person holding one of its notes
one pound on demand or, if the director decided, one pound and six pence at the end of six months,
w,Ohichi  is about a 5 percent rate of return-exactly  the usury ceiling (figure 3.2). The Bank of Scotland
was implicitly saying:  "it is costly for us to hold very high amounts of reserves.  We do not have a
fractional reserve banking system anymore.  We can try to insulate ourselves against these note attacks
by saying that we will pay you if we can, but if too many people come in the door, we are going to hold
off, and instead of having to liquidate our bank now-which  would push us into bankruptcy-we  will try
to slowly liquidate our assets.  You will not get your gold immediately but you will get it in six months,
plus some interest for any inconvenience you might have experienced."
In response, the Royal Bank handed out leaflets and took out advertisements in the newspapers
describing this innovation as an outrage:  "How can you trust the Bank of Scotland?  Don't  accept their
notes because you might not get your money back.  We do not have such an option clause so you can
depend on our notes."  Also, there was uncertainty about the enforceability of this type of contract
because it was a real innovation in note contracts.  Given the concerns about people not understanding
the derivatives markets today, you can imagine the potential difficulties faced by people in the mid-
1  700s trying to understand options. The rival bank thus found it in its own self-interest to help educate
the public about this contractual innovation.
After much debate the banks and the public found that such a clause involved a perfectly
reasonable trade off.  The loss from the inconvenience of (possibly) not having immediate specie
redeemability was compensated in three ways.  The first was the direct payment of interest during the
8period of suspended convertibility.  Second, if individuals deposited their money at the Bank of Scotland,
the Bank of Scotland might be able to pay them higher interest. (Competition had already forced banks
to pay interest on deposits.)  Third, and most interesting, the option clause reduced the likelihood that a
bank would experience a liquidity crisis, which could cause the bank to collapse, thereby decreasing the
riskiness of the bank and its note issues.  The option clause can be considered an endogenous market
response to the classic "runs" problem, which plagues all fractional reserve banking systems in which
demandable debt is issued.  The more complicated debt contract, which gave the bank more time to deal
with negative liquidity shocks, addressed the core problem of bank instability that can arise from
immediate redeemability of bank debts. Here was a competitive contractual response to one of the
standard reasons for establishing central banks' role as a lender of last resort.'
Notes with the option clause became widely accepted in Scotland.  Almost all note issuers added
the clause to their notes by the early  1  760s.  There was also a further development. The Bank of Dundee
in 1763 offered payment of one pound or one pound and six pence at the end of six months in cash
(gold), specie, or in the notes of the Royal Bank of Scotland.  This type of option clause with multiple
redemption alternatives represented a move away from using gold as the sole reserve currency. People
had sufficient confidence in the Royal Bank of Scotland to accept this note from the Bank of Dundee
(knowing that in six months they would not get their specie, but a contract from the Royal Bank of
Scotland). Of course, the Royal Bank of Scotland notes contained the option clause permitting them to
delay for six months before making payment in specie.  Various contractual innovations thus arose to
tackle some of the problems that we think of as rationales for central banks to have a lender of last resort
function.
Forrest Capie makes this point in chapter 2.
9The Banking Act of 1765 ended these contractual experiments: it outlawed the option clause.
Rather than letting the market set the value of innovations, the bigger banks turned to the government to
impose regulations that would put new competitors at a disadvantage.  The option clause had helped to
make entry feasible for small banks.  The major banks did not like the increased entry and lobbied
Parliament to restrict it.  There was also concern that multiple options were not fully consistent with
common law.
The Act of 1765 also outlawed small notes, those less than one pound sterling. The ability to
issue small notes had also facilitated entry on a small scale.  If the bank must have at least one pound of
gold or specie available to meet any redemption demand (after the banning of the option clause), then the
minimal scale of operation grows. 2 In addition, arguments were made about the immorality or
irresponsibity of using paper rather than specie, which was especially problematic for the peasant and
working classes. The Act of 1765 thus greatly restricted the competitive innovative process, causing the
Scottish banking system to evolve toward the English system.
The Private Clearing House Systemn  and the Check on Overissue
Another fascinating development in the Scottish banking system occurred in 1770-71 with the creation of
a note exchange and clearing system. These functions are typically associated with central banks today,
and it is often argued that the government has a comparative advantage in setting uniform standards and
coordinating different actors.  In Scotland the note exchange system developed privately, and there was
no government intervention to force the two together.
2
One pound is worth about two hundred dollars today.
10But it was in banks' private interest to develop a payment mechanism, whicih  was beneficial both
to the banks and the individuals.  During the free banking era there was currency competition:  the large
banks were competing to expand their note issues at the expense of the others.  In the first half of the
eighteenith  century banks would frequently refuse to accept notes from other banks because acceptance
might promote liquidity and hence the demand for the rivals' notes.  But refusal to accept others notes
was inconvenienit  to bank customers.  Banks began to experiment by making bilateral exchanges. The
first bilateral exchanges were made in Edinburgh in the 1760s; some of the smaller provincial banks also
provided note acceptance services and set up some bilateral exchanges.  Eventually, by 1771,  the three
big banks, all of whichi  were headquartered in Edinburgh, were willing to bring the provincial banks into
their main note-clearing system.  A private clearing system thus emerged without any government
intervention.
The note clearing system was based in Edinburgh and met once a week. Banks would net their
balances against each other.  The Royal Bank, for example, would claim to have 1,000 pounds of Bank
of Scotland notes.  The Bank of Scotland would claim to have 900 pounds of Royal Bank notes.  The
Bank of Scotland would then transfer 100 pounds, either in specie, securities, or deposits to the Royal
Bank.
The increased acceptance of bank notes was most important for the smallest banks because the
largest banks - the Bank of Scotland, the Royal Bank, and the British Linen Bank - were already very
well known and accepted.  If a Bank of Dundee note would be accepted at the British Linen Bank or the
Royal Bank, the note became much more valuable.
Why would the big banks want to include the little banks if, by doing so, they were primarilv
benefiting the little banks?  Because this system helped keep the notes in circulation a lot longer.  If
customers could go to any bank to redeem a note, then they would accept a Royal Bank of Scotland note,
11for example, and hold it ionger.  The Edinburgh bank notes could thus be used more easily at greater
distances from the head offices (where redemption would take place).  All banks wanted to increase their
note circulation since their notes, as long as the option clause was not invoked or banned, were non-
interest bearing.  The private note exchange and clearing system that developed in Scotland is not an
isolated example. In the United States during the nineteenth century a similar private system
developed-the  Suffolk system.
In addition to the convenience for the users of notes and convenience for the banks from the
weekly netting of claims, the note exchange and clearing system put an important a check on excess note
growth by any of the individual issuers.  The "law of reflux" is how the Scots described the mechanism
by which this system restrains note growth.  To see how this system operates, consider a case in which
the Bank of Dundee began to issue a lot of notes relative to their gold reserves or the amount of good
assets they might be able to turn into gold.  What will happen at the weekly meeting?  The Bank of
Dundee will begin to have adverse clearings because all other banks will be holding  a lot of Bank of
Dundee notes relative to the amount of their notes that the Bank of Dundee is holding.  At the weekly
meeting the other banks will demand specie, London deposits, or securities from the Bank of Dundee.
And the Bank of Dundee will then have to reduce its note issue or face bankruptcy.
Still, there were attempts to inflate away the value of one bank's  notes.  The spectacular collapse
of the Ayr Bank is one example.  The Ayr Bank began to have adverse clearings and delayed, claiming
that the funds were on their way up from London.  But the funds never arrived.  The Ayr Bank
dramatically over-issued and went bust. While this example illustrates that the note clearing system was
12not perfect, the Ayr Bank's over-issue was detected early, and the losses were fairly limited. 3 And there
were not any other important instances of over-issue during the period.
In order to get into the note exchange, a bank would have to be reputable.  The clearinghouse did
not set up explicit liquidity requirements or explicit capital requirements.  And there were no government
requirements on these matters.  Members simply had to be able to meet the regular netting payments by
the end of the week.  Adverse clearings would signal to the other members that something may be
wrong, and exclusion from the system was possible.  I he clearing system thus turned into a system of
prudenitial  private regulation because being in the note exchange system was sending a clear signal to the
public that if these other banks, who best knew what was going on within the bank, are willing to accept
these notes, then an ordinary person might be willing to accept them also.  It thus performed an important
information function.  No system of prudential regulation, publicly or privately created and enforced, is
witliout flaws, but this system was relatively successful.
The note exchange system also had some beneficial effects on the fractional reserve system in its
ability to conserve on specie holdings and maintain stability.  After the option clause was outlawed,
banks had to increase their specie reserves substantially, typically holding about 50 percent of their
demandable liabilities in their own specie or directly available specie throughi  their correspondents in
London.  But this amount fell dramatically to roughly 2 to 3 percent of what they were actually holding
3  As noted above, all except the three large chartered banks in Edinburgh have unlimited liability so this
was another mechanism that helped to protect the holders of Ayr Bank notes.  For the Ayr Bank, there
was roughly between a five-fold and a ten-fold assessment on each share, that is, if an owner had a share
worth one pound par value, that person would then have to pay to the creditors between five and ten
pounds for the losses that occurred.  Eventually the note holders of the Ayr Bank did receive most of
their nominal value, although they did have to wait before getting their money back.
13in terms of gold or direct access to specie. The conveniences of the note exchange system helped
customers to become more accepting of these notes and more confident in the system.
Competition was pushing the banks to reduce reserves so that they could provide higher interest
rates or more services to their depositors.  The margin of 2 to 3 percent of reserves worked fairly well
because the Scottish system was more stable than the English system, which did not have this sort of
note clearing system, but rather the Bank of England monopoly of note issuance.  The English had
relatively small banks that were restricted in how large they could grow because the Bank of England did
not want to face competition.  Assuming that bank failure rates are a measure of relative stability, the
banking system in Scotland was much more stable.  Less failures occurred even though the Scottish
banks were holding relatively low amounts of specie. People had great confidence in the system, and the
system was run very well, so that it survived several shocks without disruptions. One major shock that
affected to both the English and Scottish systems, however, was the Napoleonic wars.  The Scottish
system followed the English system in suspending all specie payment in 1797 (even though initially they
had no legal basis for doing so), when the Bank of England suspended redemption on its notes.  This
example shiows  the importance of Londoni  as a financial center for Scotland-the  Scottish banks relied
heavily on their correspondents in London for access to specie.  The Scottish banks did not open
branches in London because they would have lost their right to issue notes.  The Bank of England had
secured a regulation preventing any bank operating an office within a certain distance of London from
issuing notes.  Hence, the Scottish banks relied on these correspondent relationships.
During the twenty-year suspension period the note exchange system operated in Scotland but
witliout the anchor of gold.  In Scotland, as in England, the price level did not rise rapidly until the end of
this period.  When the Bank of England resumed gold redemption, the pound was returned to its
presuspension level, and thus the price level returned to its previous level.  During the suspension the
14note exchange helped to prevent wild overissue, even though there was no explicit requirement of
redemption in gold, because they required redemption in other assets-bills  of exchange, government
securities, and so on.
Resumption of the gold standard was followed by some banking problems in England during the
1  820s.  These problems sparked some legal changes that permitted some partnerships to have limited
liability.  This change allowed some larger partnerships to form and compete more directly with the
Bank of Scotland, the Royal Bank, and the British Linen Bank.  But the competition with respect to note
issue ended in the 1840s with Peel's Bank Act.  This act also marked the end of the Scottish free banking
era.  Free entry was no longer allowed, and a cap was put on note issuance.  This regulation effectively
created  a cartel among existing note issuers.  Also, the Scottish banks became much more directly
controlled by the Bank of England.
Unrestricted Branching as a Substitutefor  Deposit Insutrance
An important aspect of the Scottish system durinig  the free banking era was the unrestricted ability to set
up branches.  Branching helped make the system stable by allowing regional diversification and thereby
acted as a substitute for deposit insurance.  During the free banking period banks in Scotland were
consolidated in the main financial center of Edinburgh but stretched, through unlimited liability
partnerships, to secondary cities and towns (table 3. 1). Through time, both the public banks (limited
liability) and the others increased their number of branches, but the public banks' branching networks
were far more extensive (table 3.2).  In the 1820s the public banks had almost fifteen branches each,
whiereas  the other banks had an average of three branches each.  The three public banks also tended to be
much larger than the other banks.  The big three banks were branched throughout the country; they could
receive deposits from and make loans in many different areas and, consequently, were relatively well
15diversified.  The smaller bankis  were less diversified.  In the absence of a deposit insurance system banks
naturally diversified their deposit and lending base through branching.
A Conmparison  of the English and Scottish Banking Systems
Before drawing lessons from the Scottish experience, I will contrast some aspects of the banking system
in the emerging market of Scotland witil its more-developed southern neighbor.  This comparison is
necessary because I am arguicg that the Scottishi  banking system helped Scotland to quickly catch up to
England.
The English system is much more heavily regulated because of the Bank of England's
dominance, the restrictions on note issuance, and, importantly, the prohibition on entry with more than
six partners.  The last regulation forced the English banks to remain fairly small.  Clearly, the restrictions
were directed at shielding the Bank of England from competition.
The density of banking (as measured by the number of banking offices per ten thousand
inihabitanits)  is greater for Scotland at the turn of the century, whien  Scotland was still developing relative
to Englanid  (table 3.3).  By the end of the free banking era, however, the figure for Scotland had grown
by roughly 250 percent, whereas in England it had increased by less than 50 percent.  The Scottish
system thus offered far more opportunities for banking activities.
Banking depth is a measure often used in the development literature to determine hiow  successful
the banking system is at intermediating and whether it is playing an important role.  Comparing per
capita banking assets in pounds sterling, this number is approximately 20 percent greater in Scotland
than in England.  The turn-of-the-century numbers are particularly striking when you consider that the
Scots were less wealthy and consequently had fewer assets per capita at that time.  By the middle of the
16century  banking  assets per capita had grown  to be more  than  twice that of England. These  brief
comparisons  underscore  the success  of Scottish  system.
One of the innovations  made during  the Scottish  free  banking  era, which  also may have
contributed  to the rapid  development  of the Scottish  economy,  was the "cash credit overdraft"  system,
whicih  is analagous  to writing  overdrafts  on a checking  account  today. The Scots  may have been the first
to create  a line of credit that a firm or merchant  could  obtain in advance. This overdraft  ability  gave
great flexibility  to individuals  wanting  to take advantage  of immediate  purchasing  opportunities  or to
industrialists  who  might  not be able to exactly  predict  their cash needs six months  in advance. Such
innovations  may have  facilitated  investment  and industrialization  in Scotland;  they were much less
common  in England.
Finally,  note that both of these  systems  were concentrated  initially. Open entry is not
inconsistent  with dominant  players. There is not as dramatic  a contrast  as one might have  originally
thought  between  the market  share of banking  assets in Scotland  held by the three public banks  with the
Bank of England's  share in England. The three Scottish  banks  and the Bank  of England  began  the
century  with a majority  of banking  assets held  in their respective  countries,  but have  their market shares
eroded by the middle  of the century. The large  role of the three public banks  in Scotland,  however,
differs from that of the Bank of England  because  the Scottish  banks  were competing  and the Bank of
England  had many  monopoly  protections. In addition,  the Bank  of England  enjoyed  a much closer
relationship  with the government.
Lessons for Reformers  Today
17Can any lessons for current policy can be drawn from this historical episode? I have argued that the
situation of eig,hteenthi  and nineteenth century Scotland is very similar to that in many emerging markets
today.  Thus I believe that the Scottish free banking experience can inform the policymaking process.
What are the lessons then that can be drawn for current policy (table 3.4)?  1 will group them into
three related sets.  The first set concerns private institutions and monitoring, which is typically thought to
be the responsibility of central banks.  Two issues arise: the feasibility of privately developing and
operating a clearing system and the feasibility of privately developing and enforcing capital and liquidity
standards.  As the Scottish case illustrates, financial institutions have strong private incentives to create
their own clearing system, which would benefit both the banks and the public.  In creating such a system,
the financial institutions develop standards for capital, liquidity, and prudential management that will
become requirements for membership in the system.  Illustrations of these incentives at work today are
the private clearing houses that the Chicago Board of Trade and Chicago Mercantile Exchange have set
up,  whiich  enforce such requirements on their members.  Another lesson holds that competition is
generally compatible with stability and coordination, although the excessive note issue by the Ayr Bank
demonstrates that the system did not eliminate all rogues.  The Ayr Bank is the only major exception to
the smooth operation of the private clearing and monitoring system in more than a century, and the
system helped to contain the problems from this bank's collapse.  The system worked well in fulfilling
the roles typically thought to be the domain of a central bank.
The next set of lessons concerns private alternatives to deposit insurance or to a central bank to
maintain confidence in and foster the stability of the financial system.  We learn that bank branching and
portfolio diversification can contribute to the stability of the banking system.  In addition, some form of
extended liability beyond simple limited liability of the shareholders might give depositors and note
holders some assurance that a bank could withstand a negative shock. Notes issued by both limited and
18unlimited liability banks successfully competed against each other during the free banking era, so it is
unclear from this experience whether one is clearly superior to the other.
An option clause and other contingent or equity-like contracts can solve or minimize the
problems of bank runs that can cause trouble for a fractional reserve banking system.  Even in the
relatively unsophisticated financial environment of eighteenth century Scotland, where the law was
unsettled, clever contractual solutions to problems of instability, like the option clause, developed and
became widely accepted.  Exploring such alternatives could hold great promise for emerging and
transition economies.
The final set of lessons concern broad features of competition in the financial system.  In
Scotland we witnessed the feasibility of new and sophisticated bank liability contracts created through
competition, even if people had no experience with such instruments before.  The final lesson, closely
related to that above, establishes the great importance of free entry for promoting innovation and
providing information.  Competition gave rise to the option clause innovation, and rivals made the public
aware of the consequences of the new contract.  What may seem like a fabulous idea to policymakers
may not survive the market test, and this test is fundamental for any financial innovation.
I will end with a question:  is there thus any need for a central bank acting as a lender of last
resort to the financial system?  There has been controversy about the role of the Bank of England in the
Scottish system.  The Bank of England certainly had no legal obligation to intervene in the Scottish
system.  In fact, it wvas  not explicitly obligated to intervene in the English system during this period.  To
some extent (mostly after resumption of the gold standard in 1819) the Bank of England did operate like
a shadow central bank (particularly in times of trouble) and provided loans to some large lenders and
some large borrowers.  As Forrest Capie showed in chapter 2, central banking functions can evolve
without explicit passage of regulations.  The Bank of England may be an example of a bank that has no
19requirements  to intervene,  particularly  in Scotland,  but occasionally  provided  some extra support  to the
system in times of stress. An  explicit  central  bank may not be needed,  but rather mechanisms  to provide
added liquidity,  perhaps  through  the clearing  system, in times of trouble.
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22Table 3.1  The Number of Banks in Scotland in Selected Years
District  1772  1810  1830
Edinburgh  21  13  12
Glasgow  5  4  5
Secondary burghs  4  12  15
Lesser burghs  1  8  4
Total  31  37  36
Sozurce:  Carr and Mathewson (1988); Checkland (1975).
23Table 3.2  Bank Size in Scotland in Selected Years
Average for the three  Fpublic"  banks  Average for unlimited liability banks
Mean Total Assets (in  Mean Number of  Mean Total Assets (in  Mean Number of
pounds per bank)  Branches per  pounds per bank)  Branches per
Bank  Bank
Year
1772  220,000  1.3  88,000  0.07
1802  2,215,000  12.3  200,000  0.86
1825  3,754,000  14.7  398,000  L  2.82
Sozurce:  Carr and Mathewson (1988); Checkland (1975).
24Table 3.3: Contrasts between Banking in Scotland and England
A.  Banking density (nlumber of bank offices per 10,000 inhabitaants)
Year  Scotland  England
1802  0.56  0.48
1845  1.41  0.71
B.  Banking depth (banking assets per inhabitant in pounds sterling)
Year  Scotland  England
1802  7.46  5.97
1845  18.05  9.00
C.  Banking concentration (share of bank assets held by three public banks and Bank of England)
Year  Scotland  Bank of England
1802  54 %  58 %
1845  33 %  36 %
Sozurce:  Checkland (1975); Munn (1981); and Slaven and Aldcroft (1982).
25Table 3.4  Lessons from the Scottish Free Banking Experience
o  Feasibility of private clearing system
o  Feasibility of private development and enforcement of capital and liquidity  standards
o  Competition is compatible wvitli  prudence and coordination
o  Feasibility of sophisticated note and deposit contracts
o  Importanice  of free entry to promote innovation
o  Branching and portfolio diversificationi  can substitute for deposit insurance
o  "Extended" liability can substitute for deposit insurance
o  "Option clause" and equity-like contracts can substitute for deposit insurance
o  Is any role left for a central bank as lender of last resort?
26Figure 3.1  Time Line of Selected Events during the Scottish Free Banking Era, 1716-1845
1716  I  Bank of Scotland monopoly of note issue ends.
I  Entry of Royal Bank of Scotland and British Linen Company.
I  "Note Dueling."
1750s/1760s  I  "Option clause" note develops and becomes widespread.
1765  I  Option clause notes and small denomination notes outlawed.
1770s  I  Note exchange and clearing system develop.
1797  I  Suspension of gold convertibility (Napoleonic Wars).
1819  Resumption of gold convertibility at pre-war par.
1820s  Restrictions on entry by limited liability partnerships eased.
1844-1845  Peel's Banking Acts end free entry into note issuance.
27Figure  3.2  BANK OF SCOTLAND NOTE WITH OPTION CLAUSE
Source: Checkland  (1975)
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